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ABSTRACT
CHI-SQUARED DISTANCE AND METAMORPHIC VIRUS DETECTION
by Annie H. Toderici
Malware are programs that are designed with a malicious intent.
Metamorphic malware change their internal structure each generation while still
maintaining their original behavior. As metamorphic malware become more
sophisticated, it is important to develop efficient and accurate detection techniques.
Current commercial antivirus software generally try to scan for malware signatures
within files and match them against a known set of signatures; therefore, they are
not able to detect metamorphic malware that change their body from generation to
generation, with each copy comprised of its own unique signature. Machine learning
methods such as hidden Markov models (HMM) have shown promising results in
detecting metamorphic malware. However, it is possible to exploit a weakness in
HMMs and avoid detection by morphing and merging the malware with contents
from normal files. As an alternative approach, we consider combining HMMs with
the statistical framework of the chi-squared test to build a new detection method.
This paper will present the experimental results of our proposed hybrid detector in
metamorphic malware detection.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Over the past decade, computers have become a tool in our daily lives. People
use email to write their correspondence instead of using traditional paper letters
and the postal service. Driven by the advances in Internet and cloud computing
technology, most businesses and organizations offer online services. Banks and
financial organizations provide online access to their customers, allowing them to
initiate transactions (for example, their customers can pay their bills through this
system), and offer other services including depositing checks without having to go to
the local branch of the bank. Government agencies such as the Department of
Motor Vehicles now also allow drivers to renew driver licenses or car registrations on
their websites [1]. Public transportation agencies such as the Bay Area Rapid
Transit also rely on computers to transmit the route locations and schedules to their
operators to make sure that they are safe [2].
This convenience of computers and the massive importance they play in our
daily lives also drew an increase in malware (malicious software) attacks [3].
Malware writers are enticed by the potential profit they can obtain by controlling a
massive number of computers and potentially extracting high value information
from them (for example, credit card numbers, bank accounts, user names, and
passwords to email accounts). Since our society relies so much on computers,
malware poses a very serious threat to virtually all people using computers.
Due to the potential profit malware writers can make, the number of
malicious software application has been rising speedily, and some of the attacks
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caused extensive financial damage and interruption. According to McAfee,
MyDoom is a massive spam-mailing malware that caused the most monetary
damage of all time, an estimated $38 billion, and Conficker is a password-stealing
botnet that caused an estimated of $9.1 billion in damages [4]. The most common
types of attacks against users are designed to commit identity theft or credit card
fraud. Sometimes they cause damage on the computer by overwriting data on the
hard disk, encrypting important data, or blackmailing the user.
In order to prevent infections by computer viruses, or malware attacks,
antiviral defense is generally applied. There are many antivirus defense systems
based on algorithms such as signature detection, code emulation, heuristic code
analysis, and machine learning. Signature detection is the most commonly used
algorithm for detecting viruses [5]. It relies on a large database of known signatures
for viruses and malware, and it matches them against all the files on the user’s
computer. If any one signature is matched to a file, it means that the file is likely to
be infected by the corresponding malware such as a virus. Traditionally, this
method has been very effective for detecting most na¨ıve viruses. The weakness of
the signature detection technique is that it cannot detect new or previously
unknown variants of viruses.
Malware writers know this weakness and have been creating variations of
viruses by employing a variety of code obfuscation methods [6]. The most common
methods for code obfuscation are reordering instructions, renaming registers,
making spaghetti code, substituting sets of equivalent instructions, and inserting
junk code. Metamorphic viruses normally apply these methods. They are the most
difficult type of virus to detect since they morph into a new copy at each infection.
Previous research has shown that machine learning methods such as hidden
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Markov models (HMMs) can be used to detect metamorphic viruses [7]. However,
the new metamorphic virus generator created by Lin [8] has been shown to be
capable of defeating the HMM-based detection methods.
We studied the statistical properties of the χ2 test (which is also written in
literature as “chi-squared test”) and its relevance to virus prediction tasks, as
suggested by Filiol and Josse’s theoretical framework [9]. We show that the χ2
distance test, which is computed directly on instruction frequencies, can benefit
virus detection and identification. We present our proposed hybrid virus detector
based on the HMM and the χ2 distance and its results. The goal of this project is to
determine whether simple statistics can be used to predict the presence and absence
of viruses.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives background information
on various computer viruses and the code obfuscation techniques. Chapter 3
provides an overview of the antivirus defense mechanisms. Chapter 4 introduces our
proposed hybrid virus detector. Chapter 5 briefly discusses the performance
evaluation techniques. Chapter 6 presents our experimental setup. Chapter 7
discusses the experimental results. The conclusion is presented in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2
Malware
Malicious software or malware is software designed for malicious purposes.
Some malware may delete, overwrite, or steal user data. In general, this type of
software can cause damage to the user’s computer and may steal vital information.
Since this is a broad definition, malware can be classified into categories such as
viruses, worms, trojan horses, spyware, adware, or botnets. Since there is
substantial overlap between these type of malware, we refer to them simply as
“viruses” [5]. We can further classify viruses based on the way they try to conceal
themselves from being detected by antivirus programs [10]. These categories are
“encrypted,” “polymorphic,” and “metamorphic.”
2.1 Encrypted Viruses
“Encrypted viruses” refer to those viruses that encrypt their body using a
specified encryption algorithm but using different keys at every infection. Each
encrypted virus has a decryption routine that usually remains the same, despite the
fact that the keys change between infections. Therefore, it is possible to detect this
class of viruses by analyzing the decryptor in order to obtain a reasonable signature.
Figure 1 shows an encrypted virus example.
Encrypted viruses tend to use simple algorithms for encryption. Common
variants use algorithms such as XORing the body of the virus with the encryption
key. Despite its effort to encrypt its body, this type of viruses can be easily detected
by signature detection. Listing 2.1 illustrates a simple encryption code written in
assembly using the XOR function in the decryption loop with the key 0x55.
4
Figure 1: Encrypted virus before and after decryption.
dec rypt l oop :
lodsd ; l oad a doub le word
xor eax , 0 x55555555 ; xor each by t e wi th 0x55 ( encrypt or decryp t )
stosd ; s t o r e back the word
sub ecx , 4 ; decrease the counter by 4 ( b y t e s )
jnz dec rypt l oop ; as long as t he r e are b y t e s l e f t , cont inue
Listing 2.1: An example of a simple decryptor code.
2.2 Polymorphic Viruses
Polymorphic viruses are similar to encrypted viruses, but they obfuscate the
decryption code by mutating it. Even though there are many variants of these
decryptors, it is still possible to locate all the signatures of these decryptors. In
addition, if a part of the code of a program looks “suspicious,” we can test it by
running it in a virtual machine and analyzing the effect it has on its own code
segment. When the code finally decrypts itself, we can look for the signature for that
decryptor or even the decrypted body of the virus. Therefore, polymorphic viruses
can still be detected by signature detection, although it is time consuming to find
the reliable signature patterns given the possible diversity of decryptor bodies and
possibly the high cost of having to run the virus inside a virtual machine for cases in
which the detection algorithm cannot determine whether the file is infected or not.
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Figure 2: Multiple shapes of a metamorphic virus at each generation.
2.3 Metamorphic Viruses
Related to polymorphic viruses, metamorphic viruses change their internal
structure on each generation. Unlike polymorphic viruses, the entire virus changes
at each generation while still maintaining its original behavior. Figure 2 illustrates
the multiple shapes of a metamorphic virus. Virus writers have tried various
techniques when implementing metamorphic engines such as reordering subroutines,
inserting garbage instructions, exchanging register usage, or substituting equivalent
instructions. As metamorphic viruses become more sophisticated, it is important to
develop efficient and accurate detection techniques. Current generation antivirus
software applications generally try to scan for virus signatures within files to locate
any known virus. This technique is used very often simply because it is not only
effective in detecting known viruses but it is also very efficient. However, since
metamorphic viruses change their body from generation to generation, each
generation has its own unique signature. Therefore, current antivirus software
program cannot detect variants of these viruses with ease.
Even though it is difficult to detect this type of virus, it is also difficult for
malware writers to implement it correctly. The problem is that virus writers need to
be able to make their malware mutate without arbitrarily increasing in size.
Moreover, in the case of metamorphic viruses, the virus writers may need also to be
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able to detect whether any particular file is infected so that the virus will not try to
reinfect it again. All these issues are very difficult to address programmatically,
without causing bugs in the code or potentially providing the antivirus programs an
easy way of detecting the virus.
Many malware writers claim that they have implemented virus generators
that are metamorphic. However, studies [7, 11] that analyzed such generators, have
shown that only very few of them exhibit true metamorphic behavior. The studies
included the following examples of generators that claimed to be metamorphic but
were not: Phalcon/Skism Mass-Produced Code generator (PS-MPC), Second
Generation virus generator (G2), Mass Code Generator (MPCGEN), and Virus
Creation Lab for Win32 (VCL32) [12]. Out of all the generators that claimed to be
metamorphic, only the Next Generation Virus Construction Kit (NGVCK) is indeed
metamorphic [7, 11].
2.3.1 Virus Obfuscation Techniques
Code obfuscation techniques are generally applied when creating metamorphic
viruses. These techniques when used in combination are able to create a vast
number of distinct copies with equivalent code and behavior.
2.3.1.1 Register Renaming
Register renaming is one of the simplest techniques use in metamorphic
generators. This is done by simply replacing the registers that the instructions use
with different ones. See Figure 3 for an example. This technique does not fool the
human eye when applied, since it is easy to spot by looking at the disassembled
code, but it changes the binary bit pattern from the executable files and thus
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generates a slightly different signature. Since the opcode sequences are not changed,
it is still possible to detect this register renaming technique by using wildcard
strings [13]. An example wildcard would need to be able to match sequences of MOV
Reg, 4, MOV Reg, Reg, SUB Reg, 1. Reg represents the register used, and it can be
ax, bx, cx, eax, ebx, etc.
Figure 3: Register renaming example.
2.3.1.2 Equivalent Instruction Replacement
The instruction set for many modern Complex Instruction Set CPUs (CISC)
have instructions that can either be substituted by an equivalent instruction with
the same effect or with a sequence of other instructions that cause the same
behavior. An example of such instruction-level equivalence is MOV eax, 0 which is
equivalent to SUB eax, eax or XOR eax, eax. Figure 4 illustrates an example
where a single instruction is replaced with a sequence of instructions with an
equivalent effect.
Figure 4: Equivalent instructions substitution.
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2.3.1.3 Instruction Reordering
Instruction reordering is done by transposing instructions that do not depend
on the output of previous instructions to generate a different but equivalent
sequence of instructions. Due to the fact that now the instructions are reordered,
the signature of the code is different, but since none of the instructions with
dependencies were changed, the actual outcome of the code is identical to the
original. Figure 5 shows that the last instruction can be transposed since it does not
affect the outcome of the other instructions. However, the first instruction has to
come before the second instruction; therefore, the ordering cannot be changed there.
In addition, the figure also demonstrates that register renaming can be employed
simultaneously with instruction reordering. This results in a powerful method for
avoiding detection, since making wildcard signatures that are able to capture this
behavior becomes much more difficult and computationally expensive.
Figure 5: Instruction reordering and equivalent instructions substitution.
2.3.1.4 Inserting Junk Code
Junk code is code that once executed will not affect the behavior of the
program. Typically, junk code is inserted randomly throughout the body of the
virus during the morphing process. The intention is that such junk code will confuse
signature-based antiviruses. The most common example of junk code is randomly
inserting the NOP instruction. This instruction simply does nothing in terms of
affecting the CPU state, and modern detection algorithms usually have a rule to
9
remove or treat specially the NOP instructions encountered in executable files.
However, there are other examples of junk code such as MOV eax, eax, ADD eax, 0,
and SUB eax, 0.
It is possible to create relatively long sequences of instructions that, once
chained together, have absolutely no effect except for making the detection of the
“live” code more difficult. A jump instruction can be added right in front of this
long sequences of junk instructions in order to completely skip it during runtime.
Since the location of such code can be random, it can make signature-based
approaches less likely to succeed, and multiple signatures must be used in order to
properly detect such viruses.
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CHAPTER 3
Malware Detection
Antiviruses and malware detection programs have been developed to combat
these threats. Most antivirus programs are built with the assumption that the virus
does not change its structure or code. With the constant evolution of virus creation,
there are many areas of improvement, and both academia and antivirus software
developers continually conduct research in order to lessen the threat from virus
makers. This section discusses several detection approaches such as signature
detection, heuristic detection, and the use of machine learning techniques.
3.1 Signature Detection
Commercial antivirus software typically uses signature detection to identify
malicious files. A signature is created by analyzing the binary code of a virus body,
and selecting a sequence of byte code that is unique to that virus [5]. This string of
bytes extracted from the virus must be uniquely different from normal benign files.
The signature has to be long enough that it would not appear in normal files, which
would also almost guarantee that this signature will not be shared with other
viruses either. An example of a signature extracted from the Chernobyl/CIH virus
can be detected with the following sequence of bytes [14]:
E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4251 5050
0F01 4C24 FE5B 83C3 1CFA 8B2B
String matching algorithms are normally applied as the scanning mechanism
in antiviruses. Algorithms such as Aho-Corasick, Veldman, and Wu-Manber are a
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few string matching algorithms used [10]. The Aho-Corasick algorithm can only
scan for exactly matching signatures, thus a slight variation will escape being
detected [15]. Veldman and Wu-Manber proposed the use of wildcard search strings
to help detecting these slight variants of the viruses [6].
After locating a malware signature, antivirus software vendors incorporate
this signature into their database of virus signatures which they maintain and push
out to their users. This has created a market for antivirus makers, since they now
charge subscription fees for updating the virus signature database for the user.
Scanning files against a large database of virus signatures is simple and
efficient. Users of antivirus software only need to click on the “start scanning”
button or set a recurring scanning schedule, and the antivirus will do the work of
scanning the hard-drive. However, this ease of use, and the relatively high speed of
scanning comes at a cost: the virus database needs to be kept up to date. Moreover,
the antivirus software is not able to detect all existing malware, because if none of
the current signatures match a particular new malware, it will not be known until
the antivirus makers acquire the signature for it. Thus, unknown viruses are very
unlikely to be detected during a signature-based scan.
Antivirus software makers maintain the database of virus signatures by
constantly searching the Internet for new viruses and generating suitable signatures
for all viruses they find. This leads to a completely reactive scenario where the
antivirus manufacturers are unable to combat a new virus until after it has caused
damage. Fortunately, it is possible to find new viruses by simply reading the right
internet forums where users trade new viruses. In addition, keeping contact with
customers who found suspiciously behaving files is an invaluable source of
information on new malware.
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3.2 Heuristic Detection
Heuristic analysis can be used to detect unknown viruses and variants of
known viruses. Heuristic analysis is either done using static or dynamic analysis.
When encountering a suspicious program, static heuristic analysis will disassemble
it for further study. The code is analyzed to see whether there are matching viral
code patterns that are close to known viruses. The code will be evaluated and given
a percentage of similarity to viruses, and if it surpasses a threshold, this program
will be marked as infected [10].
In the case of dynamic heuristic analysis, the suspected program is executed
under a virtual machine which is monitored for any viral behaviors. Once the
program exhibits any viral behaviors, this program will be marked as infected.
Examples of viral behavior include attempting to open other executable files with
the intent of modifying their content, attempts to change the Master Boot Record
(in case of boot sector viruses), or attempts at concealing themselves from the
operating system. In addition, most modern antiviruses now provide programs
which run in the background, and constantly monitor for suspicious behavior [10].
3.3 Machine Learning Techniques
Machine learning techniques have gained popularity in recent years. Tom
Mitchell defines machine learning as the study of computer algorithms that improve
through experiments [16]. Examples of such techniques are Na¨ıve Bayes [17],
decision trees [18], hidden Markov models [7, 11], and other statistical learning
methods [9].
Back in 1986, Cohen [19] proposed an undecidability theorem of virus
detection which indicates that it is impossible to find a single algorithm that can
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detect all possible viruses. Chess and White [20] also further supported this idea by
showing that there exist viruses which cannot be detected by any algorithm.
Therefore, we are focusing on the detection of metamorphic viruses generated using
the NGVCK virus and Lin’s metamorphic generator [8]. Machine learning
techniques such as the HMM and χ2 statistical framework will be the main focus of
this project, which we will introduce in the following two sections.
3.4 Hidden Markov Model
A hidden Markov model (HMM) is a statistical modeling method that has
been used in speech recognition, bioinformatics, mouse gesture recognition, credit
card fraud detection, and computer virus detection research. The HMM is one of
the most popular models to use for sequential data. It is widely used because it is
simple and it is computationally fast.
The popularity of HMMs within the virus detection community stems from
the fact that programs can be represented as sequences of instructions. The CPU
executes them one at a time, which effectively means that programs can be treated
as time series: the type of data that HMMs excel on.
A hidden Markov model is a stochastic model which assumes that the
underlying data can be expressed as a Markov process with hidden states. In
essence, it can be viewed as a variant of a probabilistic state machine, where the
transition probabilities from one state to another depend only on the current state.
A Markov model assumes that sequential data can be modeled based solely on
the current state, with absolutely no memory. What happens next in the sequence
depends only on the current state with nothing in the past influencing the state
transition. In a typical Markov chain, the states are fully observed. In the case of
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Table 1: The list of symbols and their meanings.
Symbol Description
T The length of the observation sequence
N The number of states in the model
M The number of distinct observation symbols
O The observation sequence O = {O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1}
Q The set of states of the Markov process
V The set of observation symbols
A The state transition probability matrix
B The observation probability matrix
pi The initial state distribution
λ The hidden Markov model, as defined by its parameters A, B, pi, is
depicted as λ = (A,B, pi)
hidden Markov model, as its name implies, the states are never observed, as they
are “hidden.” We can only estimate these states while observing sequences of data.
HMM will choose the sequence of states that jointly maximizes the probability of
the entire observation sequence [21].
3.4.1 Notation
In order to mathematically describe the HMM, we will use the notation
summarized in Table 1. The main components for the HMM are the state transition
probability matrix (A), the observation probability matrix (B) which gives the
likelihood of observation given the state, the initial state distribution (pi),
observation sequence (i.e. O = {O0,O1,O2,O3}), and the hidden states (i.e.
X = {x0, x1, x2, x3}). The first three elements define the HMM model (λ) such that
λ = (A,B, pi). Matrices A and B are row stochastic, so each row must sum up to 1.
pix0 is the probability of starting in the first state (x0). ax0,x1 is the probability of
transitioning from state x0 to state x1. Finally, bx0 (O0) is the probability of
observing O0 at state X0.
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Figure 6 shows a graphical representation of a generic HMM. The Markov
process gives the transition between states. However, in the case of hidden Markov
model, the transition between states is not observed, as the states are “hidden.”
The state transitions are placed above the dashed line, in order to indicate the fact
that we do not “know” what the transitions should be. The transitions are
“learned” by analyzing the observations (below the dashed line). Only the
observation sequence is available for study while the state transition sequence of the
Markov process is hidden behind the dashed line. The Markov process is estimated
by knowing the initial state x0 and the state-to-state transition probabilities
obtained from the matrix A. The observation sequence is related to the states of the
Markov process by the matrix B, which describes the probability of observing a
particular symbol in a given state.
Figure 6: Markov Process. Reprinted with permission from [21].
HMM is used to solve three problems:
1. For the first problem, we want to find the probability of this observed
sequence O happening under a given model λ. An example use for this is
computing the probability of a file being a virus. The forward algorithm, or
α-pass, is used to determine the likelihood of the observed sequence.
2. The second problem intends to find the hidden state sequence from the
sequence of observations and a given model λ. The Viterbi algorithm and
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backward algorithm, or β-pass, are used to find the optimal state sequence. An
example application of this, assuming a HMM with two hidden states would
be to determine the most “virus-like” areas of a file, where “virus-like” would
be associated with the model being in a specific state. In practice, however, it
is enough to simply determine the probability of a file being a virus.
3. The last problem finds the model λ that maximizes the probability of a given
observation sequence O. The Baum-Welch algorithm can provide an
estimation for the model parameters given the observations.
Here, we are interested in the application of these algorithms and to ensure
consistency across our research, we utilized the HMM library from [21].
3.4.2 Example HMM
An example from [21] will be used to illustrate the concepts of HMM. Suppose
we are meteorologists working to determine the average annual temperature of a
particular location over a series of years. Let’s assume that the years of interest
occurred before the invention of thermometers. Given this, there is no way of
knowing exactly what the temperature was during the time of interest. However,
let’s say that researchers found evidence of the temperature being related to the
growth of the trees. In this case, we can estimate the temperature based on the
observation of tree ring sizes instead. The temperature will be either hot (H) or cold
(C), and the tree ring sizes are either small (S), medium (M), or large (L).
Suppose that researchers have evidence which gives them the temperature
transition probabilities and relationship between the temperature and the tree ring
sizes. For the temperature to transition from a hot year to a cold year, the
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probability is 0.3, and thus there is a higher chance of 0.7 for the temperature to
remain hot. The probability for the next year to stay hot is therefore 0.7. For a cold
year to transition to a hot year, the probability is 0.4, and again, there is a higher
chance of 0.6 to remain cold for another year. Equation 1 is the matrix
representation of the temperature transition probability which we have described
thus far. This is the state-to-state transition matrix A:
H C
H
C
[
0.7 0.3
0.4 0.6
]
(1)
In a hot year, the probabilities of the small, medium, and large tree ring sizes
are 0.1, 0.4, and 0.5 respectively. In a cold year, the probabilities are 0.7, 0.2, and
0.1 for the small, medium, and large tree ring sizes respectively. Table 2 shows the
matrix for the observation-to-state transition probabilities B.
The initial state probability distribution for a hot year is 0.6 and 0.4 for a cold
year. Now the goal is to observe a four year period of tree ring sizes to determine
the most likely state sequence of the Markov process. In this four year period, the
tree ring sizes are S, M, S, L. To simplify the observation notation, S is represented
as 0, M as 1, and L as 2. Using this notation, the observation sequence O is
{0, 1, 0, 2}. Table 2 summarizes the parameters for this particular HMM:
Let’s set X = {x0, x1, x2, x3} to be a generic state sequence of length four.
The probability of the state sequence X can be calculated using the formula given in
Equation 3, where Ok refers to the kth element of O.
Normally,
P (X) = pix0P (x1|x0)P (x2|x0, x1)P (x3|x0, x1, x2) (2)
18
Table 2: Parameter values and their explanations.
Parameter and Value Explanation
O = {0, 1, 0, 2} The observation sequence for this model
V = {0, 1, 2} The observation symbols of tree ring sizes, corre-
sponding to S, M, and L
Q = {H,C} The states in the model of states are H and C
T = 4 The length of the observation sequence of O =
{0, 1, 0, 2}
N = 2 The number of states in the model with states of
either H or C
M = 3 The number of observation symbols with tree ring
sizes of S, M, and L
A =
[
0.7 0.3
0.4 0.6
]
The state transition probabilities
B =
[
0.1 0.4 0.5
0.7 0.2 0.1
]
The observation probabilities
pi =
[
0.6 0.4
]
The initial state transition probabilities
However, under the HMM assumptions, this equation becomes:
P (X) = pix0bx0(O0)ax0,x1bx1(O1)ax1,x2bx2(O2)ax2,x3bx3(O3) (3)
To find out how likely the state sequence of HHCC is to occur, we can use the
formulation from Equation 3. Substituting the symbols for their values, we obtain:
P (HHCC) = (0.6)(0.1)(0.7)(0.4)(0.3)(0.7)(0.6)(0.1) = 0.000212 (4)
Given the observation sequence, in order to find the optimal hidden states
sequence, we can use the Viterbi algorithm and the backward algorithm. The most
probable symbol is chosen at each position based on Table 3. Thus, the optimal
state sequence for O = {0, 1, 0, 2} is CHCH.
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Table 3: Probabilities for Hot/Cold given the four observations.
Element
0 1 2 3
P(H) 0.188170 0.519432 0.228878 0.803979
P(C) 0.811830 0.480568 0.771122 0.196021
3.5 Chi-Squared Distance
Statistical analysis is commonly used by professionals and researchers to
evaluate statements or claims. The two major areas of inferential statistics are
estimation of parameters and hypothesis testing. We will illustrate what these terms
mean with the following example.
A study is commissioned for compiling home prices at location A. After
gathering data on the prices at that location, a histogram of the prices is plotted.
The histogram graph is simply summarizing the possible price ranges, by counting
the number of houses within each possible price bucket. This graph exhibits a
bell-shaped curve demonstrating the normal distribution. The bell shape is centered
at the average (or mean) house price. The majority of the prices should be close to
the average, with a few “outlier” values for prices which either cost a very large sum
of money, or for those houses which are in foreclosure and cost very little.
Now, let us suppose the same study is conducted at another location, B. After
gathering the housing prices, a graph is also plotted using data received. If location
B is from a similar area to A, this graph should yield a similar bell-shaped graph.
Statistical testing will be applied to see whether these two graphs are significantly
similar or different from each other.
Since each graph is assumed to follow a normal distribution, it is useful to
summarize the data before comparing it. The parameters of this distribution are
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estimated from the data at location A, and from the data at location B. Using a
statistical test, we can determine whether the estimated parameters are sufficiently
close or far apart in order to draw a conclusion.
3.5.1 Notation
Suppose that X is a statistical variable coming from a distribution under
observation. The goal is to estimate the main characteristics of X’s probability
distribution P . Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be a random sample of elements from this
distribution. These samples reveal some information about the unknown parameter
θ that are used to estimate the probability law P . The function that depends on
X1, X2, . . . , Xn which is used to estimate θ is denoted by f(X1, X2, . . . , Xn), and it
is called an estimator function. An estimator function is used to compute the
probability distribution on every sample. The notation θ∗n = f(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) will
be used to measure an estimate for an unknown feature θ of P .
The parameter space from which θ is drawn is completely arbitrary, and it
depends on the problem and the choice of f . For example, it may be equal to the
set of natural numbers, N, or the k-dimensional real numbers, Rk. To further
illustrate this idea with a typical usage scenario, if θ represents the parameters of a
normal distribution, it will have two dimensions, in which the first dimension would
correspond to the mean, µ, and the second to the variance, σ. For the purpose of
malware analysis, the parameter space is restricted to all k-dimensional vectors with
dimensions coming from the set of natural numbers. The form of P is assumed to
be known.
The statistical testing is used to decide which hypotheses will be likely belong
to the observation samples (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). In statistical testing, one or more
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initial hypotheses are proposed which will either be kept or rejected after testing on
the likelihood of these hypotheses with respect to the probabilistic law of X.
There can be many hypotheses but we will only consider two. The initial
hypothesis is denoted H0 and is referred to as the null hypothesis. The alternative
hypothesis is denoted as H1. The tests which we are interested in will either accept
or reject these two hypotheses.
In order to build a test for a given sample, an estimator E is used as the
decision threshold to decide whether to keep or reject the null hypothesis. The
observed value e will be computed on this sample and compared with the estimator
value, E. This threshold will have two sets of disjoint values with acceptance region
A and rejection region B.
There are two types of errors associated with any detection problem:
• The type I error, denoted as α, represents the false positive probability rate.
This error indicates that the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis.
• The type II error, β, represents the false negative probability rate. This error
indicates the non-detection rate where the null hypothesis is kept, while the
alternative hypothesis is actually the correct one.
In an antiviral context, the type I error is more important than the type II
error, and it is usually difficult to determine the type II error due to the unknown
number of non-detections.
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3.5.2 Statistical Testing on Malware Detection
In order to formalize the virus detection framework, we will discuss some
notation proposed by Chess and White [20]. An antivirus uses a detection algorithm
D, which it applies on a program p. The goal of the algorithm is to determine
whether p is infected by a particular virus V . D(p) should return true if and only if
the program p is infected by the virus V . Filiol and Josse further expand on the
ideas from Chess and White’s idea by providing a statistical framework for
describing the detection process [9].
In the case of malware analysis, we will be considering the analysis of
instruction frequencies. We are interested in modelling the behavior of a compiler
which produces “clean” programs. The spectrum of instructions of such a compiler
is obtained by analyzing the instruction frequencies of all possible programs
produced by such a compiler. However, this is impossible to compute in an exact
form in practice. An approximation is to compute the instruction frequencies from a
large set of programs that are known to not be malware, and that are compiled with
the compiler in question.
Most compilers normally only use a small subset of all possible instructions,
whereas malware will consider the whole set or larger set of these instructions.
Knowing this fact, we can develop an estimator function which should be able to
determine whether a particular program has been compiled with the known
compiler, or whether it is malware.
The formal definition of the spectrum is:
spec(C) = (Ii, ni)1≤i≤c (5)
In Equation 5, C represents a particular compiler, Ii represents the i
th
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instruction, and ni is i
th instruction’s frequency. c denotes the total number of
unique instructions that may ever be output by the compiler.
In our experiments, the spectrum of the compiler represents the expected
value to be observed in the normal set of files. As such, in any normal file, for
instruction i we expect to observe a frequency of ni. In the case of an 80x86
compiler, at the end of 2011, the total number of possible instructions was 501 [22].
When trying to determine whether a particular file comes from a compiler
with a known spectrum, or whether the file is in fact malware, the first step we take
is to compute the instruction frequencies observed in this file. We denote the
observed frequency for instruction i by nˆi.
There are a few important formulae to consider, such as the null hypothesis,
estimator function, and the decision threshold. The null hypothesis H0 (Equation 6)
states that the frequencies are the same for the observed and expected file.
H0 : nˆi = ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ c (6)
H1 : nˆi 6= ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ c (7)
If the frequencies are the same, then the suspected file is likely to be
uninfected, and the null hypothesis will be accepted. However, if the frequencies are
significantly different, then the alternative hypothesis (Equation 7) will be accepted
which means that the suspected file is in fact infected with a virus.
Since there is more than one instruction from a compiler or from a file, these
simple hypotheses will have to be extended to consider more instructions. Filiol and
Josse [9] purposed an estimator function to set up these hypotheses.
One choice for the estimator function, is D2, is also known as the Pearson’s χ
2
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statistic test, and is expressed as follows:
D2 =
c∑
i=1
(nˆi − ni)2
ni
(8)
Pearson’s χ2 statistic test is commonly used to check whether the difference
between the expected and observed data is significant. The decision threshold is
obtained by comparing the estimator value given by D2 with the χ2(α, c− 1)
distribution with c− 1 degrees of freedom and a type I error rate of α. Typically,
the type I error rate is set at 0.05, which means that the test tolerates no more than
5% of the files being falsely classified as infected when they are normal files.
The updated null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are:{ H0 if D2 ≤ χ2 (α, c− 1)
H1 if D2 > χ2 (α, c− 1) (9)
The estimator D2 computes the Pearson’s χ2 distance between the spectrum
of the compiler and the current testing file. This value can be compared with the χ2
value for the given number of instructions and the desired false positive rate (in our
case, it is set to 5%).
The main goal of the χ2 statistic test is to determine whether the distribution
agrees with (or “fits”) some expected distribution.
The following steps are needed to perform the Pearson χ2 statistic test given a
compiler, and a file to be tested:
1. Set up the null hypothesis H0 and the alternative hypothesis H1
2. Choose a significance level (for example α = 0.05)
3. Compute the estimator value D2 given the frequencies in the file to be tested
and the compiler’s spectrum
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Table 4: Summary of notations.
Symbol Meaning
F An input file, which comprises of instructions X1, X2, . . . , Xn
D The detection procedure, which decides whether an input file F is in-
fected or not
N The number of assembly instructions in the code
E The estimator which measures the frequency of instructions
H0 The null hypothesis, which assumes the file is an uninfected file
H1 The alternative hypothesis, assumes the file is infected
Θ The theoretical mean value of E
α Type I error rate
β Type II error rate
4. Evaluate the acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis H0 by using
Equation 9.
3.5.3 Example
Let’s consider a simplified problem involving only three instructions with
three frequencies. Instruction Ii1 has frequency ni1 , instruction Ii2 has frequency ni2 ,
and instruction Ii3 has frequency ni3 .
For this example, the spectrum from the compiler C is listed in Table 5.
Table 5: Example compiler spectrum.
Instruction Opcode Frequency ni
i1 MOV 7
i2 PUSH 10
i3 POP 3
The observation samples for this compiler are (MOV, PUSH, POP). The
corresponding frequencies are (7, 10, 3) ∈ N3. Since we represent the distribution of
interest as a histogram over three instructions, the parameter space of the set θ is
therefore N3.
26
Table 6: Example frequencies of instructions in a program.
Instruction Opcode Frequency ni
i1 MOV 6
i3 POP 11
Suppose that we have a file which might be infected. Given the instructions
and the frequencies in Table 6, we would like to perform the χ2 test to see the
likelihood of it being uninfected.
The null hypothesis H0 is that the file is uninfected if the estimator function
D2 yields a score less than or equal to the χ2 value:
D2 =
c∑
i=1
(nˆi − ni)2
ni
≤ χ2 (α, c− 1) (10)
When computing estimator D2, we use all of the frequency counts for each
instruction. However, since χ2 is a probability distribution, the frequencies will be
normalized before performing this test. Normalization is done by dividing the count
of an instruction by the total number of instructions. For example, if there are three
MOV instructions out of a total of ten instructions, then the normalized value is 0.3.
The normalized values for the compiler’s spectrum, spec(C) are (MOV, 0.35), (PUSH,
0.5), and (POP, 0.15). The normalized values for the file are (MOV, 0.353) and (POP,
0.647).
D2 =
(0.353− 0.35)2
0.35
+
(0.0− 0.5)2
0.5
+
(0.647− 0.15)2
0.15
∼= 2.1467
We will now test the claim that the observed frequency counts agree with the
claimed distribution. The value we compare D2 = 2.1467 against is
χ2(0.05, 2) = 5.991. Since D2 ≤ χ2(0.05, 2), we accept the null hypothesis claiming
that this file is uninfected and reject the alternative hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 4
Hybrid Virus Detection
We propose a new detection method by combining the HMM detector and the
CSD estimator which we refer to as the hybrid method.
Our experiments show that the HMM detector performs extremely well in
detecting viruses morphed with dead code, while the CSD estimator performs better
in detecting viruses morphed with subroutine code from normal files. We are
interested to find a model that can combine the advantages of both. We tested two
possible approaches to combine the scores from the two algorithms: (1) an additive
model (Equation 11), and (2) a multiplicative model (Equation 12).
The additive model is motivated by the fact that in a probabilistic scenario,
we want to capture detections from either detector. The multiplicative model is
motivated by the case in which we want to emphasize high scores when both
detectors yield high scores. Probabilistically, the additive model corresponds to an
“OR,” whereas the multiplicative model corresponds to an “AND” (assuming the
two algorithms provide independent scores):
Padd(X|virus) = (PHMM(X|virus) + Pχ2(X|virus))÷ 2 (11)
Pmul(X|virus) = PHMM(X|virus) · Pχ2(X|virus) (12)
We ran experiments and evaluated the performance for both the additive, and
the multiplicative models. The better of these two is the multiplicative model, and
in the rest of this section we will discuss the details that make it work equally as
well or better than the best of HMM and CSD-based detection algorithms.
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The HMM allows us to compute PHMM(X|virus) since it is a probabilistic
model (see Equation 3 for an example). We write the probability of X being a virus
as a conditional probability in order to emphasize that the HMM was trained on
virus files. Equivalently, we can compute the probabilities when the training is done
on normal files.
The CSD is simply a score, and we can’t use it directly to compute a
probability. However, the CSD is directly related to the χ2 distribution, and its
cumulative distribution function (CDF). As such, we can write:
Pχ2(X|virus) = P (Y < D2)
P (Y < D2) = CDFχ2(D
2)
=
1
Γ(k/2)
γ(k/2, D2/2) (13)
In Equation 13, Γ is the Gamma function, k represents the degrees of freedom,
which in our case is equivalent to the number of unique instructions encountered in
the training phase. γ(k, z) is the lower incomplete Gamma function:
Γ(z) =
∫ ∞
0
tz−1 · e−tdt (14)
γ(s, x) =
∫ x
0
ts−1 · e−tdt (15)
Equation 12 makes the assumption that the scores from the HMM and CSD
are statistically independent. However, since both are trying to detect the same
thing, it is very likely that the independence assumption is not true. Moreover, a
probability given by the HMM may be more reliable in the case in which we deal
with files that have a lot of dead code, whereas the probability given by the CSD
may be more reliable when dealing with files that have been morphed with
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subroutine code. Hence, we need to find appropriate weights to combine these two
scores.
We begin by looking at the log-likelihood for the multiplicative model:
logPmul(X|virus) = logPHMM(X|virus) + logPχ2(X|virus) (16)
In this form, it is possible to assign weights to the HMM and CSD
independently, yielding logPhyb (or the log-likelihood for our method):
logPhyb(X|virus) = w1 · logPHMM(X|virus) + w2 · logPχ2(X|virus) (17)
The final probability Phyb(X|virus) is:
Phyb(X|virus) = Pw1HMM(X|virus) · Pw2χ2 (X|virus) (18)
The values of w1 and w2 were obtained by running a grid search over the set
of values between 0 and 1, using a logarithmic scale. The best values were found to
be: w1 = 10
−8 and w2 = 10−9.
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CHAPTER 5
Performance Evaluation
5.1 Cross-Validation
When the amount of data is limited, researchers have to make use of it as
efficiently as possible. Nonetheless, in order to compute meaningful statistics, a large
amount of data is necessary. This leads to a dilemma: how to obtain meaningful
results given a relatively small dataset used for both training and testing.
Researchers have used cross-validation, or rotation estimation [23] in order to
alleviate this problem. The basic idea is that since training requires as much data as
possible, it would be beneficial to use most of the data possible for training, while
leaving a small fraction for testing. Of course, just doing this will yield inaccurate
estimates of the performance of the algorithm, since too little data is used for
testing.
However, if the training data and the testing data are selected such that they
do not intersect, and the experiment is repeated many times on different subsets of
data, the accuracy of the performance estimation can be greatly improved.
Typically, researchers use five-fold cross-validation, where 80% of the data is
used for training, 20% is used for testing, and the experiment is repeated five times.
Each such selection (80:20) is called a “fold.” For each fold, the evaluation
performance is recorded. All folds are used for estimating the method’s performance
by computing the mean and standard deviation of the algorithm’s performance. If
the algorithm has multiple operating points, then a graph can be plotted showing
the various operating points as a function of the algorithm’s parameter.
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For each point on the graph, it is possible to also display the error bars
(standard deviation). The generic cross-validation approach has a drawback: if the
folds don’t contain the same distribution of classes as the original data, a biased
error will be computed, which is not desirable. For example, if the real data has a
5:1 ratio of positive to negative classes, and the folds somehow manage to capture a
10:1 ratio due to a sampling problem, then the error estimates will all be incorrect.
Therefore, in practice, an alternative method is used, called “stratified
cross-validation.”
This method ensures that the same proportion of classes is kept for each fold.
The key insight for applying stratified cross-validation is to make the splits based on
each class, as opposed to basing the split on the entire data. This allows the
algorithm to ensure an unbiased split of data.
Even stratified cross-validation is not perfect. The results can be inaccurate if
the training and testing sets contain very similar variants of the malware. As a
result, there are two distinct tasks in which cross-validation can be used: (1)
determining whether a variant of a malware can be detected, in which case it is
desirable to have (hopefully dissimilar) variants in both training and testing; (2)
determining whether the algorithm can generalize and detect previously unseen
malware, while keeping a relatively low false positive rate.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
The ideal goal of the antivirus defense is to build a detection mechanism that
can identify all malware without misclassification, to yield no false positives and no
false negatives. The ongoing battle between the antivirus industry and the malware
writers is making this situation unreachable as in [9]. Malware writers create a virus
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and then antivirus writers detect it. Once the malware writers find out, they modify
it to defeat the previous detection, and the process just keeps repeating. Unless
there are no more malware, antivirus writers have to continue their efforts to detect
and to eradicate malware.
5.2.1 Accuracy Measure
There are four possible outcomes for detection: true positive (TP), false
positive (FP), true negative (TN), and false negative (FN). A detection is
considered a true positive when a virus is correctly classified as a virus, whereas it is
a true negative when a normal file is correctly marked as non-malicious. TP and TN
are the desirable outcome from any detection. False positives occur when a normal
file is mistakenly classified as a virus. On the other hand, false negatives occur when
a virus file is not detected as a virus, and thus passes the scan as a normal file. For
antivirus makers, the goal is to have false positives as low as possible. Users tend to
be unhappy or even angry if an important normal file is identified as malicious, but
tend to be more forgiving for false negatives. In any case, both false positives and
false negatives will reduce user satisfaction. Table 7 shows the four possible
outcomes for detection.
Table 7: Possible outcomes for detection.
Predicted Class
Virus Normal
Actual Class
Virus True Positive False Negative
Normal False Positive True Negative
The true positive rate (TPR) is the number of viruses correctly identified. It
is calculated based on the number of true positives obtained from the total number
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of all viruses tested [24]:
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(19)
The false positive rate (FPR) is the number of false positives obtained from
the total number of normal files tested.
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
(20)
The overall success rate, also know as the accuracy rate, is the total number of
correct classifications obtained from the total virus files and normal files used on
testing.
Accuracy Rate =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(21)
Finally, the error rate is one minus this accuracy rate.
Error Rate = 1− TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(22)
5.2.2 Mean Maximum Accuracy
Since we performed five-fold cross-validation, we have a total of five models for
this test. Each of these folds will give an accuracy rate, and with these values we
need to evaluate the performance of the algorithms tested. Normally, a single value
is easier for comparing the performance. We propose to use the mean of the values
obtained from the five-fold cross-validation, an operation called mean maximum
accuracy rate (MMA):
MMA =
1
5
5∑
i=1
Accuracyi (23)
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5.2.3 Receiver Operating Characteristic
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) was developed for applications in
signal detection theory [25]. ROC curves have gained popularity in the machine
learning community as a tool for evaluating the performance of various algorithms
[26, 27].
Typically, a ROC curve is represented as a two-dimensional plot, in which the
X-axis is assigned to the false positive rate, and the Y-axis is assigned to the true
positive rate. Sometimes the false negative rate is used instead of the true positive
rate. In the context of virus detection, the Y-axis represents the true detection rate
corresponding to the true positive rate, and the X-axis represents the false detection
rate (i.e., a non-virus file identified as a virus by the algorithm).
The true positive and false positive rates are commonly represented in
percentage format. The true positive rate is obtained by using the true positive
count divided by the sum of true positive and false negative counts, and then
multiplied by 100 to get a value which represents a percentage. Figure 7 illustrates
an example of some ROC curves.
An algorithm that performs random classification with 50% accuracy will
generate a diagonal line in the ROC space. Anything that lies on the top left
portion of the graph represents a better classification with higher true positive rate.
The blue lines with the diamond-shaped markers from Figure 7 indicates such ideal
classification with 100% true positive rate with 0% false positive rate. The line with
red squared-shape markers correspond to an algorithm that achieves 78% true
positive rate with 10% false positive rate. The triangle-shaped markers show that
this algorithm is performing poorly in this experiment. We will present the ROC
35
Figure 7: Example ROC curves.
curves for the HMM detector, the CSD estimator, and our proposed method to
compare their performance on the metamorphic virus detection problem.
36
CHAPTER 6
Experimental Setup
6.1 Datasets
The datasets used in this project are 200 base NGVCK family viruses and 40
Cygwin utility files obtained from [7, 12, 28]. These 40 Cygwin utility files will be
used to represent the benign program files. We disassembled these executable files
by using IDA (Interactive Disassembler) Pro [29] to generate assembly files from
which 80x86 instructions have been extracted for experiments. Figure 8 illustrates
this process.
These virus and normal assembly files will be used as the input data to create
morphed versions of the virus by either employing dead code insertion and/or
subroutine copying from the normal files. Lin’s metamorphic virus generator was
modified to enable automatically generation of various morphed variants of these
200 virus files with these 40 normal files [8]. Figure 9 shows the basic steps taken to
generate the various metamorphic versions of the new virus.
The parameter for the metamorphic virus generator is set to generate
increments of 10% dead code and 10% subroutine code until the maximum of 40%.
Figure 8: Process for obtaining assembly files.
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Figure 9: Process for generating metamorphic viruses.
Some example parameters are: 0% dead code with 10% subroutine code, 0% dead
code with 20% subroutine code, 10% dead code with 10% subroutine code. There
are 25 combinations of possible parameter values, each having 200 files, resulting in
a total of 5000 files.
6.2 Data Processing
The first step is to separate the files into five groups for the five-fold
cross-validation experiments. One set is used for validation during testing phase,
while the remaining four subsets are used for training. From the 200 virus files, we
selected 160 files used for the training, and the remaining 40 files will be used for
testing purposes. In these five folds, each fold will have a set of different training file
built from 160 virus files and 40 virus files used for testing.
The assembly files were read by our program and then converted to a format
compatible with both the χ2 statistical framework that we developed for this thesis,
called the chi-squared distance estimator (CSD) and the HMM-based detector. The
processing of these input assembly files requires several steps:
• Concatenate the randomly selected files to create one training file.
• Each of these assembly files is read in line by line to check the validity of each
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line. Blank lines or labels, and lines that start with DATA or CODE, are
skipped. In addition, if a line is solely composed of a comment (meaning that
it starts with a semicolon), it is promptly removed. Ultimately, the line will be
saved for additional processing.
• For each saved line, we need to remove those lines which do not contain valid
instructions. For this purpose, we use the list of all known 80x86 instructions,
and any line that does not contain a valid instruction is simply removed.
• For all files within the training set of one fold, we build a dictionary by
computing a unique index for each instruction, from zero to N. N is the total
number of unique instructions encountered within the training partition.
• Using the dictionary containing the unique mapping between an instruction
and an index, we represent all files within a fold as a sequence of indices
corresponding to their respective instructions.
The database of instructions was created by analyzing the Core / Pentium /
Phenom documentation from both AMD and Intel. We present the complete list of
allowed instructions in Appendix A.
In order to train the hidden Markov model (HMM), the training files are
concatenated together within each fold. This results in a rather large file, containing
the instructions from 160 training files. It is important to note that the mapping
from an instruction to an index is used for both the training files, and also the
testing files. In particular, it is possible that in the testing files, there may be some
instructions which have not been seen during the training. There are two ways to
handle this: (1) those instructions which miss an index could be ignored; or (2) we
can assign a special index (N+1) to represent this fact. This required tuning on the
39
HMM, which is done by assigning a very low probability of ever encountering this
symbol, will allows detection of “suspicious” files. For example, if the training is
done on normal files (as opposed to virus files), and the estimation on a virus file, it
is possible that the virus writer is using some exotic instructions. Thus, these
instructions should also influence the final score, making it less likely to be a normal
file.
We call the mapping between an instruction and an index “an alphabet.” The
first line contains the number of observation symbols (unique instructions). The
following lines contain the ordered list of instructions (ordered in the chronological
appearance in the training set).
We use the same training input files and testing input files for HMM and the
CSD experiments. We implemented a Java program to create the input files for
both the HMM and CSD frameworks as we described. The training observation
sequence and all the testing observation sequences will need to be processed into a
format that the frameworks can understand. Each fold has one alphabet file that is
used to build the rest of the input files. The instruction (which we will also refer to
as opcode) from these observation sequences is remapped into numbers by using the
alphabet file. To further emphasize the remapping process, the first opcode will now
have index 0, and the second opcode will have index 1, and so forth. Any opcode
not in this alphabet file will receive a large number, equal to the size of the
alphabet, as its index. For example, if there are 10 opcodes in the alphabet file, the
indices are ranging from 0 to 9, then 10 indicates that the opcode does not appear
in the training file. All unseen opcodes are grouped together using the same index.
This is intended to make sure all opcodes are considered when building the
validation input files.
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6.3 HMM-based Detector Framework
Once all the input files are created, we pass the training input files as an
argument into the HMM program to build the model file. The maximum iterations
for HMM training is set at 800 and the program terminates either when it converges
or when the maximum iterations are reached. We train the HMM model using the
HMM detector from [7] to ensure consistency amongst the training and testing
performed. After HMM is trained with the input files, the output model files are
used for computing the log-likelihoods per opcode on the rest of the validation input
files.
The HMM detector will compute the log likelihood instead of raw probability
to avoid the issue of underflow. Probability usually yields results between 0 and 1,
thus when floating point numbers are very close to zero, and are multiplied with
similarly small numbers, the outcome is an underflow which will eventually result in
a “NaN”. Therefore, log likelihood is used whenever we deal with probability
problems. We will abbreviate the HMM log likelihood score as HMMLL.
The evaluation of the HMM is very fast. The reason for this operation’s speed
is that only a single pass over the data is necessary to compute the result. We
compute the log-likelihood for all the test files, then we write these scores into one
score file per fold.
6.4 CSD Estimator Framework
The CSD estimator framework is significantly faster when compared to HMM
training. Since the CSD estimator uses calculations that are based on the frequency
of opcodes, it requires very little memory and only one single pass over the training
data.
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The CSD estimator determines how far a file is from the expected distribution
of instructions. The E value, which is the expected file, can be obtained using the
same training file created for HMM training. It is used as the base comparison file
to see how other files are similar to it. The O symbol, which stands for the observed
file, is the testing file for HMM. All the instructions from the expected file will be
saved along with the total number of instructions from this file. We normalized
these counts by dividing each instruction with the total number of all instructions.
Each of the observed files is also normalized, just like the expected file, before
calculating the CSD value. The same expected file is used on one fold of
cross-validation set, while the observed files are the testing datasets. All of the
instruction frequencies from the expected files are retrieved and used to compare
with the instruction frequencies from each of the testing files.
For every instruction in the expected file it computes its contribution to the
D2 value. If there are instructions from the observed file which do not exist in the
expected file, their D2 contribution will be set to zero since dividing by zero will
yield an undefined value. However, if that instruction is not found in the observed
file, then the value is equal to the count from the expected file. The final CSD score,
which is equal to the D2 value, will be used in the experiments.
6.4.1 Bigram Frequencies Test
This test is similar to building the single instruction (unigram) frequency
table on Section 6.2. Two consecutive instructions are connected with an underline
( ) to build a new alphabet, for example, a JMP follows by a MOV will be represented
as “jmp mov”. In this experiment, we build two different sets of input files: the
alphabet in which (1) the ordering of the pair instructions sequence does matter; (2)
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the order of instruction pairs does not matter. For example, the alphabet key built
for the first case will yield “jmp mov” for instructions pair of MOV and JMP regardless
of the ordering. However, in the second case, the alphabet “jmp mov” represents two
consecutive instructions of JMP followed by MOV, and “mov jmp” will represent the
instruction pair of MOV followed by JMP.
6.5 Threshold and Evaluation Framework
Our framework will consider all possible scores obtained from the HMM
detector and CSD estimator as thresholds. Depending on the type of training file,
the score which is set as the threshold will consider all the scores that are below it
as corresponding to a virus file and everything else as a normal file. Then, the
program will calculate the TP, TN, FP and FN from all of the thresholds. These
four metrics will be used to obtain the ROC curves and accuracy scores.
The ROC curve is built by getting the TPR and FPR using the Equations 19
and 20. These values will be written to a “roc” file which is used to plot the ROC
curve. The next step is computing the accuracy using Equation 21. For all possible
thresholds, we obtained all the corresponding accuracy rates and wrote them to a
“score” file.
The final assessment will be the evaluation framework. Our mean maximum
implementation will go through each of these score files, and then return the
maximum accuracy rate. Since we have five-fold cross-validation, we have five
maximum rates - one for each fold. We then compute and compare the mean values
for easier and clearer evaluation (only need to compare two numbers to see which
one has a higher score). Finally, we will use these mean maximum scores to
determine the performance of these two detection algorithms in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
Results
In this section, we present the results of our experiments using the hidden
Markov model-based detector (HMM detector), chi-squared distance-based
estimator (CSD estimator), and our proposed hybrid virus detector. We used the
Receiver Operating characteristic (ROC) curve and the mean maximum accuracy
(MMA) rate to evaluate the performance of the three detectors. See Appendix C for
the ROC curves for all tests performed.
For consistency, we used the same set of data for all three detectors. Table 8
summarizes the five types of models we set up for these experiments. Moreover, we
will present the results of the HMM model trained on two hidden states since
previous studies [7, 11] show that the number of hidden states have minor impact
on the performance of HMM. The improvement is negligible while training a model
requires much longer time when using more hidden states. The bigrams’ approach
achieves similar or lower scores as the unigram approach, therefore, we will mainly
consider the hybrid model using the unigram CSD. The MMA scores for the
bigrams are listed in Appendix D. Our baseline consists of the performance of the
various detectors on the unmorphed viruses.
7.1 Training Set: Original Viruses
We used 80% of the 200 original NGVCK viruses without any morphing as
training data. For testing purposes, we used the remaining 20% of the files, and all
of the normal files. See Appendix B for discussion of the HMMLL and CSD scores.
Table 9 contains the MMA scores obtained using the HMM detector, the CSD
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Table 8: Files setup per parameter pair for each experiment.
Training Dataset
Normal
Original viruses
Viruses morphed with 10% dead code
Viruses morphed with 10% subroutine code
Viruses morphed with 10% dead code and 10% subroutine code
estimator, and the hybrid model on all the test sets. The score which is in bold (per
row) indicates that the detector performs the best among the other detectors tested
in that category.
HMM: The MMA rates for the HMM detector ranged from 77.25% to 99.75%. The
HMM detector performed best when the test set was the unmorphed viruses. The
lowest score occurred when the testing was done with 40% subroutine code
morphing. Viruses which were morphed with dead code alone were not very
effective, since the HMM still achieved an accuracy rate of more than 90.25%. The
ROC curve confirmed this finding as illustrated in Figure C.14. On the other hand,
as we increased the percentage of the subroutine code, it was much harder for HMM
to correctly detect the viruses. When the morphing algorithm used 40% subroutine
code, the MMA decreased by 22.50%. However, when the algorithm used 40% dead
code, the MMA only decreased by 9.50%. See Figure C.15 for the ROC curves.
The overall average MMA for the HMM detector was 84.09%, with an error
rate of 15.91%.
CSD: The MMA scores for the CSD estimator ranged from 71.46% to 99.50%. The
best MMA rate occurred when trying to detect unmorphed viruses, while the worst
rate occurred when the viruses were morphed with 40% dead code and 40%
subroutine code. Both morphing with dead code and subroutine code contributed to
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the lower accuracy rate for the CSD estimator. When using 40% subroutine code
for morphing, the performance dropped by 23.66% compared to the baseline. The
dead code variants caused a performance drop of 21.68%. The ROC in Figure C.16
illustrates the performance of virus detection with varying amounts of subroutine
code embedded, while Figure C.17 shows the viruses with dead code embedded.
The overall average MMA rate was 79.43% which was almost 5% lower when
compared to the performance of the HMM detector.
Hybrid Model: The hybrid model performed better than both the HMM and
CSD with an overall average accuracy rate of 84.94%. Our hybrid model achieved
2.16% better accuracy rate than the HMM, and a 6.82% improvement over the CSD
estimator. These results show that depending on the morphing parameters, our
proposed hybrid approach either outperformed, or at worst, was on par with the
best of the HMM and CSD methods.
7.2 Training Set: Viruses Morphed with 10% Dead Code
The training dataset consists of virus files which were already morphed with
10% dead code. Table 10 summarizes the MMA scores obtained by the HMM
detector, the CSD estimator, and the hybrid model. See the ROC curves for the
HMM detector in Figures C.18 and C.19. The ROC curves for the CSD estimator
are shown in Figures C.21 and C.20.
HMM: The HMM detector performed best when the testing files were variants of
the virus morphed only with dead code. There was a clear distinction between these
virus variants and the normal files with MMA rates of more than 99.50%, and this
model even achieved 100% accuracy rate when the comparison virus set was
morphed with more than 30% dead code and no subroutine code. This implies that
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Table 9: MMA for all detectors. Training on unmorphed viruses.
Dead Code Subroutine HMM CSD Hybrid
0% 0% 99.75% 99.50% 99.75%
10% 87.50% 85.81% 88.96%
20% 82.00% 81.58% 84.20%
30% 79.75% 80.35% 81.69%
40% 77.25% 76.84% 78.94%
10% 0% 92.00% 90.81% 93.48%
10% 86.00% 83.87% 88.47%
20% 83.00% 79.60% 84.96%
30% 78.50% 76.90% 83.46%
40% 77.50% 74.89% 80.19%
20% 0% 91.50% 86.39% 92.98%
10% 85.50% 82.66% 88.47%
20% 82.75% 78.91% 85.71%
30% 80.25% 75.91% 82.20%
40% 77.75% 74.41% 79.95%
30% 0% 90.75% 81.91% 92.22%
10% 86.50% 79.16% 88.47%
20% 82.25% 76.47% 85.71%
30% 81.50% 74.16% 82.20%
40% 79.50% 73.21% 82.20%
40% 0% 90.25% 77.82% 91.47%
10% 85.75% 76.00% 89.22%
20% 83.00% 73.97% 84.96%
30% 81.25% 73.23% 84.21%
40% 80.50% 71.46% 82.20%
Average 84.09% 79.43% 86.25%
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the obfuscation technique used on Lin’s metamorphic generator applied many
similar junk instructions throughout the morphing process. The performance
weakened when the test viruses were morphed with an increasing amounts of
subroutine code and the lowest score occurred when the viruses were morphed with
40% of subroutine code. Therefore, the higher percentage of the dead code in the
viruses variants, the easier it is for HMM to detect them. On the other hand, higher
percentage of subroutine code has a negative impact on the HMM detector’s
performance.
The overall average MMA for the HMM detector was 88.12%, with an error
rate of 11.88%.
CSD: The MMA scores of the CSD estimator for this experiment ranged from
71.50% to 95.75%. The best accuracy rate occurred when the test set was the same
variant of virus. It performed notably weaker when the test sets consisted of only
variants morphed with subroutine code, and the lowest accuracy occurred for
viruses that were morphed with 40% subroutine. However, it obtained MMA rates
over 92.00% on variants which were only morphed with dead code.
In general, the HMM detector performed better than CSD in this
experimental setup since the average MMA rate for HMM was 88.12% while the
rate for CSD was 82.72%.
Hybrid Model: The new model we proposed performed better than both the
HMM and CSD estimator in this test setup as well. The overall average accuracy
rates for the new model was 89.40%, which was an improvement of 1.28% compared
to HMM detector and 6.68% improvement compared to CSD.
48
Table 10: MMA for all detectors. Training on viruses with 10% dead code.
Dead Code Subroutine HMM CSD Hybrid
0% 0% 99.50% 92.00% 99.24%
10% 87.75% 80.75% 88.46%
20% 81.75% 76.00% 83.95%
30% 80.00% 73.50% 81.18%
40% 76.75% 71.50% 77.18%
10% 0% 99.75% 95.75% 99.24%
10% 90.75% 86.75% 90.47%
20% 85.75% 80.00% 86.46%
30% 81.75% 77.25% 83.46%
40% 80.00% 75.25% 81.20%
20% 0% 99.75% 94.00% 98.49%
10% 90.25% 87.25% 91.73%
20% 86.25% 81.75% 88.21%
30% 82.75% 78.25% 86.71%
40% 81.00% 76.00% 84.20%
30% 0% 100.00% 93.00% 98.24%
10% 93.50% 87.25% 93.47%
20% 88.75% 82.75% 91.22%
30% 84.00% 78.00% 87.46%
40% 83.00% 77.75% 86.96%
40% 0% 100.00% 92.50% 97.99%
10% 93.25% 88.00% 93.47%
20% 87.75% 82.75% 90.97%
30% 85.25% 81.50% 89.22%
40% 83.75% 78.50% 88.46%
Average 88.12% 82.72% 89.40%
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7.3 Training Set: Viruses Morphed with 10% Subroutine Code
In this experiment, the HMM model was built from virus variants that were
morphed randomly with 10% subroutine code from the normal files. For the full list
of MMA rates of all detectors, see Table 11.
HMM: When the training set consisted of virus variants morphed with 10%
subroutine code, the HMM yielded a high number of false negatives. The
metamorphic virus generator made by Lin was designed to “confuse” HMM-type
detectors by making the morphed viruses look like “normal files,” and as such, it is
expected that HMM will do poorly. The morphed files produced by this generator
had scores that were close to those of normal files [8]. The HMM detector obtained
MMA rates as low as 57%, while the best rate was only 71.25%. The HMM
performed slightly better as the percentage of dead code increased but worse when
the percentage of subroutine code increased. The ROC curves also show that HMM
was doing poorly as illustrated in Figures C.23 and C.22.
The overall average MMA rate for the HMM detector was merely 63.46%.
CSD: The CSD estimator performed surprising well when the virus was morphed
with normal files. The MMA results ranged from 86.75% to 96.25%. These results
showed that the CSD estimator performed better than HMM when applying this
obfuscation technique of morphing subroutine code from normal files. The ROC
curves are shown in Figures C.25 and C.24.
The CSD estimator has an overall average MMA rate of 89.74% while HMM
only achieves a rate of 63.46%.
Hybrid Model: Similarly, the new model performed well under this experiment.
The overall average MMA rate was 91.23%, which was higher than HMM’s 63.46%
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Table 11: MMA for all detectors. Training on viruses with 10% subroutine code.
Dead Code Subroutine HMM CSD Hybrid
0% 0% 62.25% 96.25% 97.24%
10% 60.50% 92.25% 94.97%
20% 59.25% 90.00% 92.47%
30% 58.25% 88.50% 90.72%
40% 57.00% 86.75% 88.71%
10% 0% 61.75% 95.00% 97.23%
10% 60.50% 92.50% 96.22%
20% 59.50% 90.00% 93.72%
30% 58.25% 88.75% 92.22%
40% 59.00% 88.50% 91.22%
20% 0% 65.75% 92.00% 95.23%
10% 64.25% 90.25% 94.23%
20% 64.00% 89.50% 92.72%
30% 62.25% 88.75% 91.96%
40% 59.75% 88.25% 90.97%
30% 0% 68.75% 89.50% 91.96%
10% 68.00% 89.75% 92.21%
20% 67.00% 90.25% 92.46%
30% 64.75% 88.50% 90.71%
40% 63.75% 88.25% 90.96%
40% 0% 71.25% 87.50% 90.45%
10% 70.25% 88.75% 91.46%
20% 69.25% 88.75% 91.46%
30% 66.00% 87.75% 90.96%
40% 65.25% 87.25% 89.71%
Average 63.46% 89.74% 92.48%
by 29.02% and higher than CSD’s 89.86% by 2.74%. In this experiment, it
outperformed the two detectors for every possible morphing parameter combination.
7.4 Training Set: Viruses Morphed with 10% Dead Code and 10%
Subroutine Code
In this experiment we examined the scenario in which the training is done on
virus variants which have been morphed with 10% dead code and 10% subroutine
code from random normal files. See Table 12 for comprehensive MMA results.
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HMM: The HMM detector performed poorly as long as the model was trained on
virus variants which were morphed with subroutine code from normal files. The
previous experiments also confirmed the finding that Lin’s method of inserting
subroutine code from normal files is very effective in confusing the HMM detector.
For this experiment, the highest MMA rate was 78.25% when the viruses were
morphed with 40% dead code, while the lowest was 57.00% when the viruses were
morphed with 40% subroutine code. The ROC curves also show that HMM detector
performs poorly under this experimental setup in Figure C.26 and Figure C.27.
The HMM detector only achieved an overall average MMA rate of 66.35%,
with an error rate of 33.65%.
CSD: The CSD estimator has higher MMA rates when compared to the HMM
detector. The CSD estimator performed best when the viruses were morphed with
10% dead code, achieving a MMA rate of 97.75%. The lowest MMA rate occurred
when viruses were morphed with 40% subroutine code, with a rate of 83.50%. This
experiment again showed that the CSD estimator performed better in distinguishing
viruses morphed with subroutine code. Figures C.28 and C.29 show the ROC curves
for this experiment.
The overall average MMA rate of the CSD estimator was 91.45%.
Hybrid Model: The new model performed 0.16% better than the CSD estimator
with an overall average MMA rate of 91.61%. The differences between the best
scores and our model were less than 2.30%. However, compared to the HMM, the
hybrid model has an average MMA rate which is higher by 25.26%.
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Table 12: MMA for all detectors. Training on viruses with 10% dead code and 10%
subroutine code.
Dead Code Subroutine HMM CSD Hybrid
0% 0% 64.50% 90.00% 90.73%
10% 61.50% 90.25% 90.22%
20% 60.25% 87.75% 87.71%
30% 58.00% 86.25% 84.71%
40% 57.00% 83.50% 81.20%
10% 0% 65.00% 97.75% 97.73%
10% 63.00% 95.50% 95.47%
20% 62.00% 92.75% 91.72%
30% 60.50% 91.00% 90.22%
40% 60.50% 88.50% 87.71%
20% 0% 69.25% 96.25% 96.98%
10% 67.00% 94.00% 94.48%
20% 65.00% 92.25% 92.47%
30% 63.75% 90.75% 90.97%
40% 60.75% 89.50% 88.97%
30% 0% 74.25% 95.00% 95.23%
10% 73.50% 93.00% 94.97%
20% 71.50% 92.75% 93.47%
30% 67.75% 89.75% 90.97%
40% 67.50% 89.75% 90.97%
40% 0% 78.25% 93.75% 93.97%
10% 75.75% 93.50% 94.48%
20% 73.50% 91.00% 92.72%
30% 70.25% 91.50% 91.71%
40% 68.50% 90.25% 90.71%
Average 66.35% 91.45% 91.61%
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7.5 Training Set: Normal Files
This experiment was performed using 32 randomly selected normal files for
training. The testing phase used the remaining eight normal files not used during
training, and 40 variants of viruses. Table 13 summarizes the MMA scores
performed by HMM detector, CSD estimator, and the proposed hybrid detector.
HMM: According to the MMA, the HMM detector performed extremely well under
this experimental setup. The MMA scores ranged from 97.50% to 99.17%. We
concluded that the HMM detector trained with normal files yielded an excellent
detection rate and low false positive rate. Figures C.30 and C.31 show the ROC
curves for this experiment.
The HMM detector achieved an overall average MMA rate of 98.32%, and an
error rate of 1.68%.
CSD: The MMA scores obtained from this test were reasonably good with scores
ranging from 87.50% up to 98.33%. The virus morphed with 40% dead code and
40% subroutine code had the lowest MMA score of 87.50%. The highest MMA score
was obtained when compared with viruses that had no morphing, achieving a MMA
rate of 98.33%. Figures C.32 and C.33 show the ROC curves for this experiment.
The CSD estimator had an overall average MMA score of 90.74%, which was
7.62% lower than the HMM detector’s score of 98.32%.
Hybrid Model: In this particular experiment, our hybrid model achieved an
overall average MMA rate of 98.26%. It outperformed the CSD estimator by 7.56%
but performed worse than the HMM detector by 0.06%. The results show that our
hybrid model achieved the same level of accuracy with the HMM detector for every
possible morphing parameter combination except in three cases. This difference was
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Table 13: MMA for all detectors. Training on normal files.
Dead Code Subroutine HMM CSD Hybrid
0% 0% 99.17% 98.33% 99.17%
10% 98.75% 93.33% 98.75%
20% 98.75% 91.67% 98.33%
30% 98.33% 91.25% 98.33%
40% 98.33% 91.67% 98.33%
10% 0% 99.17% 95.00% 99.17%
10% 98.75% 91.25% 98.75%
20% 98.33% 90.42% 98.33%
30% 98.33% 90.42% 98.33%
40% 98.33% 90.42% 98.33%
20% 0% 98.75% 92.92% 98.33%
10% 98.33% 89.58% 97.92%
20% 98.33% 90.42% 98.33%
30% 98.33% 87.92% 98.33%
40% 98.33% 88.75% 98.33%
30% 0% 98.33% 92.08% 98.33%
10% 98.33% 89.58% 98.33%
20% 98.33% 89.17% 98.33%
30% 97.92% 88.33% 97.92%
40% 97.92% 88.33% 97.92%
40% 0% 97.92% 91.25% 97.92%
10% 97.92% 90.00% 97.92%
20% 97.50% 89.58% 97.50%
30% 97.50% 88.33% 97.50%
40% 97.92% 87.50% 97.92%
Average 98.32% 90.70% 98.26%
not large enough to conclude that this detector performed significantly worse than
the HMM, since there were only 8 normal files in the testing set, and the difference
was smaller than 1
(8×5) .
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
In this project, we made use of the frequency analysis of instructions and
statistical methods in developing a detection model inspired by previous research
[7, 9, 11]. Our goal was to detect metamorphic viruses created by Lin’s
metamorphic virus generator. We explored its weaknesses by analyzing the virus
variants’ ease of detection using both the HMM detector and the CSD estimator.
We found that the HMM detector performed well in detecting virus variants
with dead code morphed from Lin’s generator. The CSD estimator did better in
detecting virus variants that had subroutine code embedded by Lin’s generator.
With these two attributes in mind, we set out to create a hybrid model to better
detect these viruses. We designed a hybrid detection model which uses probabilistic
scores from both the HMM and the CSD detectors. Since the two underlying
algorithms don’t perform equally well, we optimized weights for each of the
detectors by performing a grid search.
The results showed that the proposed hybrid model was able to beat the
scores of both the HMM detector and CSD estimator when the training files are
virus variants. However, it performed at the same level as the HMM alone when the
training is done on normal files.
Future work would include the investigation of more statistical models and
evaluation of their performance in a similar setup as presented in this paper.
Another possible extension would be to analyze other metamorphic viruses, and use
a significantly larger number of normal files.
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APPENDIX A
80x86 Opcodes
Table A.14: Instruction set used to build the dictionary for data processing.
aaa aad aas adc add
addpd addps addsd addss addsubpd
addsubps and andnpd andnps andpd
andps arpl bound bsf bsr
bswap bt btc btr bts
call cbw cdq clc cld
clflush cli clts cmc cmovcc
cmp cmppd cmpps cmps cmpsb
cmpsd cmpss cmpsw cmpxchg cmpxchg8b
comisd comiss cpuid cvtdq2pd cvtdq2ps
cvtpd2dq cvtpd2pi cvtpd2ps cvtpi2pd cvtpi2ps
cvtps2dq cvtps2pd cvtps2pi cvtsd2si cvtsd2ss
cvtsi2sd cvtsi2ss cvtss2sd cvtss2si cvttpd2dq
cvttpd2pi cvttps2dq cvttps2pi cvttsd2si cvttss2si
cwd cwde daa das dec
div divpd divps divsd divss
emms enter f2xm1 fabs fadd
faddp fbld fbstp fchs fclex
fcmovcc fcom fcomi fcomip fcomp
fcompp fcos fdecstp fdiv fdivp
fdivr fdivrp ffree fiadd ficom
ficomp fidiv fidivr fild fimul
fincstp finit fist fistp fisttp
fisub fisubr fld fld1 fldcw
fldenv fldl2e fldl2t fldlg2 fldln2
fldpi fldz fmul fmulp fnclex
fninit fnop fnsave fnstcw fnstenv
fnstsw fpatan fprem fprem1 fptan
frndint frstor fsave fscale fsin
fsincos fsqrt fst fstcw fstenv
fstp fstsw fsub fsubp fsubr
fsubrp ftst fucom fucomi fucomip
fucomp fucompp fwait fxam fxch
fxrstor fxsave fxtract fyl2x fyl2xp1
Continued on Next Page. . .
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haddpd haddps hlt hsubpd hsubps
icebp idiv imul in inc
ins insb insd insw int 3
int n into invd invlpg iret
iretd ja jae jb jbe
jc jcxz je jecxz jg
jge jl jle jmp jna
jnae jnb jnbe jnc jne
jng jnge jnl jnle jno
jnp jns jnz jo jp
jpe jpo js jz jcc
lahf lar lddqu ldmxcsr lds
lea leave les lfence lfs
lgdt lgs lidt lldt lmsw
lock lods lodsb lodsd lodsw
loop loopcc lsl lss ltr
maskmovdqu maskmovq maxpd maxps maxsd
maxss mfence minpd minps minsd
minss monitor mov movapd movaps
movd movddup movdq2q movdqa movdqu
movhlps movhpd movhps movlhps movlpd
movlps movmskpd movmskps movntdq movnti
movntpd movntps movntq movq movq2dq
movs movsb movsd movshdup movsldup
movss movsw movsx movupd movups
movzx mul mulpd mulps mulsd
mulss mwait neg not or
orpd orps out outs outsb
outsd outsw packssdw packsswb packuswb
paddb paddd paddq paddsb paddsw
paddusb paddusw paddw pand pandn
pause pavgb pavgw pcmpeqb pcmpeqd
pcmpeqw pcmpgtb pcmpgtd pcmpgtw pextrw
pinsrw pmaddwd pmaxsw pmaxub pminsw
pminub pmovmskb pmulhuw pmulhw pmullw
pmuludq pop popa popad popaw
popf popfd por prefetchh psadbw
pshufd pshufhw pshuflw pshufw pslld
pslldq psllq psllw psrad psraw
psrld psrldq psrlq psrlw psubb
psubd psubq psubsb psubsw psubusb
Continued on Next Page. . .
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psubusw psubw punpckhbw punpckhdq punpckhqdq
punpckhwd punpcklbw punpckldq punpcklqdq punpcklwd
push pusha pushad pushf pushfd
pxor rcl rcpps rcpss rcr
rdmsr rdpmc rdtsc rep repe
repne repnz repz ret retf
retn rol ror rsm rsqrtps
rsqrtss sahf sal sar sbb
scas scasb scasd scasw seta
setae setb setbe setc sete
setg setge setl setle setna
setnae setnb setnbe setnc setne
setng setnge setnl setnle setno
setnp setns setnz seto setp
setpe setpo sets setz setcc
sfence sgdt shl shld shr
shrd shufpd shufps sidt sldt
smsw sqrtpd sqrtps sqrtsd sqrtss
stc std sti stmxcsr stos
stosb stosd stosw str sub
subpd subps subsd subss sysenter
sysexit test ucomisd ucomiss ud2
unpckhpd unpckhps unpcklpd unpcklps verr
verw wait wbinvd wrmsr xadd
xchg xlat xlatb xor xorpd
xorps
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APPENDIX B
Analysis of HMM and CSD Scores
B.1 Training on Virus Files
When the HMM is trained on virus data, the HMMLL scores for viruses are
always higher than the scores of the normal files. In general, all the five-folds
validation results show a clear separation between the two types with the exception
of one file from one of the test sets. The resulting scores in Figure B.10 show that
the virus files are different from normal files with all the viruses in this test set
scored higher than -5.74, while the normal files scored below -6.60.
The CSD scores are the opposite of HMMLL scores. When training on virus
files, and comparing the CSD score between a virus file and a normal file, the score
for the virus should be lower than for the normal file. The lower the score produced
by CSD, the more similar the compared file is to the training set. Example scores
from the CSD estimator is plotted in Figure B.11. For the first fold of this
experiment, using base viruses as training, the normal files have CSD scores above
0.59, while all the unmorphed virus files have scores below 0.43. Our CSD estimator
performs fairly well in distinguishing the virus variants and normal files in this
setup.
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Figure B.10: HMMLL scores for base viruses generated by NGVCK.
Figure B.11: The CSD scores for the base virus.
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B.2 Training on Normal Files
In this experiment, when applying the HMM, the resulting scores for the
normal files are higher than the virus files. All eight of the normal files score above
-2.45, while all the virus files score below -17.55. Figure B.12 depicts the HMMLL
computed on the first fold of the validation set with base viruses. From the figure, it
is clear that the virus files are different from normal files.
Figure B.12: HMMLL scores for HMM model trained on normal files and tested on
base viruses.
The virus files scores are higher than normal files’ scores. Figure B.13 shows
the scores obtained from the first fold of cross-validation set from the CSD
estimator. In this fold, the observed files are the base virus files. All eight of the
normal files score below 0.47, while the virus files score above 2.40. Since CSD
estimates how close an observed file is to the expected file, the lower the score, the
more similar it is to the expected file (in this case, normal).
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Figure B.13: The CSD scores when trained trained on normal files and tested on
unmorphed viruses.
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APPENDIX C
ROC Curves
We present the ROC curves in order to illustrate how dead code and
subroutine morphing affect the HMM and the CSD detectors.
In the ROC graphs, we plot several parameter combinations for each detector.
The legend of each graphs contains series with names such as 0s0, 0s10, or 20s10.
The number before the letter “s” represents the amount of dead code with which
the virus was morphed with, while the number following the “s” indicates the
amount of subroutine code which was used for morphing.
C.1 Training Set: Original Viruses
Training set consists of original viruses without applying additional morphing.
The ROC curves for the HMM detector is illustrated in Figure C.14 and
Figure C.15.
The following two figures in Figure C.16 and Figure C.17 illustrated the ROC
curves for the CSD estimator. ROC curves show that the HMM detector performed
better than CSD estimator in this experimental setup.
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Figure C.14: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on unmorphed viruses, and tested
on virus variants morphed with dead code.
Figure C.15: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on unmorphed viruses, and tested
on virus variants morphed with subroutine code.
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Figure C.16: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on unmorphed viruses, and tested
on virus variants morphed with subroutine code.
Figure C.17: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on unmorphed viruses, and tested
on virus variants morphed with dead code.
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C.2 Training Set: Viruses Morphed with 10% Dead Code
The training set consists of virus files morphed with 10% dead code. The
ROC curves for the HMM detector is illustrated in Figure C.18 and Figure C.19.
The following two figures in Figure C.20 and Figure C.21 illustrated the ROC
curves for the CSD estimator. The ROC curves show that the HMM detector
outperformed the CSD estimator in this experimental setup.
Figure C.18: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10% dead
code, and tested on virus variants morphed with dead code.
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Figure C.19: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10% dead
code, and tested on virus variants morphed with subroutine code.
Figure C.20: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10% dead
code, and tested on virus variants morphed with subroutine code.
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Figure C.21: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10% dead
code, and tested on virus variants morphed with dead code.
C.3 Training Set: Viruses Morphed with 10% Subroutine Code
The training set consists of virus files morphed with 10% subroutine code
from normal files. The ROC curves for the HMM detector is illustrated in
Figure C.22 and Figure C.23. The following two figures in Figure C.25 and
Figure C.24 illustrated the ROC curves for the CSD estimator.
The ROC curves show that the HMM detector performed significantly poorer
than CSD estimator when the viruses were morphed with 10% of subroutine code.
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Figure C.22: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10%
subroutine code, and tested on virus variants morphed with dead code.
Figure C.23: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10%
subroutine code, and tested on virus variants morphed with subroutine code.
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Figure C.24: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10% sub-
routine code, and tested on virus variants morphed with dead code.
Figure C.25: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10% sub-
routine code, and tested on virus variants morphed with subroutine code.
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Figure C.26: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10%
subroutine and 10% dead code, and tested on virus variants morphed with dead
code.
C.4 Training Set: Viruses Morphed with 10% Dead Code and 10%
Subroutine Code
The training set consists of virus files morphed with 10% dead code as well as
10% subroutine code from normal files. The ROC curves for the HMM detector is
illustrated in Figure C.26 and Figure C.27. The following two figures in Figure C.29
and Figure C.28 illustrated the ROC curves for the CSD estimator.
The ROC curves show that the CSD estimator performed relatively well when
compared to the HMM detector. In fact, the HMM detector performed extremely
poor in this scenario with high false positive rate.
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Figure C.27: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10%
subroutine and 10% dead code, and tested on virus variants morphed with subroutine
code.
Figure C.28: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10% sub-
routine and 10% dead code, tested on virus variants morphed with dead code.
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Figure C.29: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on viruses morphed with 10% sub-
routine and 10% dead code, and tested on virus variants morphed with subroutine
code.
C.5 Training Set: Normal
The training set consists of normal files. The ROC curves for the HMM
detector is illustrated in Figure C.30 and Figure C.31. The following two figures in
Figure C.32 and Figure C.33 illustrated the ROC curves for the CSD estimator.
The ROC curves show that the HMM detector performed extremely well in
this case. It achieved score closed to 100% true positive rate with 0% false positive
rate.
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Figure C.30: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on normal files, and tested on virus
variants morphed with dead code.
Figure C.31: ROC for the HMM detector, trained on normal files, and tested on virus
variants morphed with subroutine code.
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Figure C.32: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on normal files, and tested on virus
variants morphed with dead code.
Figure C.33: ROC for the CSD detector, trained on normal files, and tested on virus
variants morphed with subroutine code.
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APPENDIX D
Analysis of Unigram and Bigram Features
We tested three different types of features used by the CSD estimator. When
training the unigram model, we simply used instructions as features. The
alternative was to use bigrams. Bigrams are groups of two instructions instead of a
single instruction. When using a bigram model, there are two possible choices in
terms of how to group consecutive instructions. The first is to simply use the two
consecutive instructions in the order they appeared in the file. The other is to
always make sure that the first instruction in the bigram comes alphabetically
before the second (i.e., sorted). We refer to the first approach as “unordered
bigrams” while the second is referred to as “ordered bigrams.”
We demonstrate the concepts described above with the following instruction
sequence: MOV, AND (listed in the order in which they appear in the file). The
unigrams, in this case are simply mov and and. The ordered bigram is and mov,
while the unordered bigram is mov and.
In our four experiments, we observed that the unigram model outperformed
the bigrams in three cases. Therefore, in our hybrid virus detector, we chose to only
use the unigram model.
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D.1 Training on Unmorphed Virus Files
The unigrams performed better overall when compared to bigrams.
Table D.15: MMA for unigrams and bigrams. Training done on unmorphed viruses.
Dead Code Subroutine Unigrams Ordered Bigrams Unordered Bigrams
0% 0% 99.50% 97.00% 88.00%
10% 85.75% 82.75% 89.25%
20% 81.50% 79.50% 90.50%
30% 80.25% 76.00% 89.75%
40% 76.75% 72.25% 89.50%
10% 0% 90.75% 86.00% 78.00%
10% 83.75% 80.75% 79.00%
20% 79.50% 78.00% 78.50%
30% 76.75% 75.75% 78.25%
40% 74.75% 73.50% 79.75%
20% 0% 86.25% 83.00% 68.50%
10% 82.50% 79.50% 69.50%
20% 78.75% 76.75% 72.00%
30% 75.75% 73.50% 72.50%
40% 74.25% 73.50% 73.25%
30% 0% 81.75% 82.00% 61.00%
10% 79.00% 79.50% 64.00%
20% 76.25% 76.50% 65.50%
30% 74.00% 75.00% 67.75%
40% 73.25% 74.50% 67.75%
40% 0% 78.00% 80.75% 55.75%
10% 76.00% 78.00% 58.75%
20% 74.00% 76.00% 59.50%
30% 73.25% 74.50% 61.50%
40% 71.50% 73.50% 63.25%
Average 79.35% 78.32% 72.84%
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D.2 Training on Virus Files Morphed with 10% Dead Code
Out of the four experiments we performed, this is the only case when the
unigram model did not outperform the bigram models. The unordered bigrams
performed better than the unigram model by 0.56%.
Table D.16: MMA for unigrams and bigrams. Trained on morphed viruses with 10%
dead code.
Dead Code Subroutine Unigrams Ordered Bigrams Unordered Bigrams
0% 0% 92.00% 96.25% 69.75%
10% 80.75% 83.25% 71.00%
20% 76.00% 79.75% 72.75%
30% 73.50% 79.25% 73.25%
40% 71.50% 74.75% 73.50%
10% 0% 95.75% 95.50% 85.25%
10% 86.75% 88.25% 85.00%
20% 80.00% 83.00% 84.00%
30% 77.25% 81.00% 83.00%
40% 75.25% 78.50% 81.75%
20% 0% 94.00% 93.75% 89.25%
10% 87.25% 87.00% 87.50%
20% 81.75% 83.00% 87.75%
30% 78.25% 80.25% 87.00%
40% 76.00% 78.75% 86.50%
30% 0% 93.00% 91.75% 87.50%
10% 87.25% 86.75% 86.75%
20% 82.75% 83.00% 85.75%
30% 78.00% 81.00% 86.25%
40% 77.75% 80.75% 85.00%
40% 0% 92.50% 91.00% 87.50%
10% 88.00% 85.00% 86.50%
20% 82.75% 82.00% 86.00%
30% 81.50% 81.25% 86.50%
40% 78.50% 79.75% 87.00%
Average 82.72% 78.32% 83.28%
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D.3 Training on Virus Files Morphed with 10% Subroutine Code
The unigram model performed better than the bigram models in every
parameter combination.
Table D.17: MMA for unigrams and bigrams. Trained on morphed viruses with 10%
subroutine code.
Dead Code Subroutine Unigrams Ordered Bigrams Unordered Bigrams
0% 0% 96.25% 78.50% 78.75%
10% 92.25% 77.25% 75.25%
20% 90.00% 74.50% 76.75%
30% 88.50% 75.50% 75.25%
40% 86.75% 73.00% 75.75%
10% 0% 95.00% 76.00% 68.00%
10% 92.50% 75.00% 68.25%
20% 90.00% 76.25% 67.50%
30% 88.75% 73.50% 68.50%
40% 88.50% 72.75% 67.50%
20% 0% 92.00% 75.75% 62.50%
10% 90.25% 74.50% 61.50%
20% 89.50% 74.75% 65.25%
30% 88.75% 73.75% 66.25%
40% 88.25% 73.00% 66.00%
30% 0% 89.50% 73.25% 56.50%
10% 89.75% 74.00% 57.25%
20% 90.25% 73.25% 58.50%
30% 88.50% 74.25% 58.75%
40% 88.25% 71.50% 59.50%
40% 0% 87.50% 72.25% 53.50%
10% 88.75% 71.50% 55.00%
20% 88.75% 73.00% 56.00%
30% 87.75% 72.50% 55.25%
40% 87.25% 72.50% 56.25%
Average 89.74% 74.08% 64.38%
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D.4 Training on Virus Files Morphed with 10% Dead Code and 10%
Subroutine Code
The unigram model performed better than the bigram models in most
parameter combinations except in three cases.
Table D.18: MMA for unigrams and bigrams. Trained on morphed viruses with 10%
dead code and 10% subroutine code.
Dead Code Subroutine Unigrams Ordered Bigrams Unordered Bigrams
0% 0% 90.00% 88.00% 88.50%
10% 90.25% 81.25% 89.25%
20% 87.75% 80.50% 88.00%
30% 86.25% 79.50% 86.75%
40% 83.50% 79.25% 86.25%
10% 0% 97.75% 83.50% 89.75%
10% 95.50% 80.75% 88.00%
20% 92.75% 77.75% 87.50%
30% 91.00% 75.50% 85.75%
40% 88.50% 75.25% 83.00%
20% 0% 96.25% 75.25% 83.00%
10% 94.00% 72.50% 81.75%
20% 92.25% 71.25% 81.75%
30% 90.75% 69.25% 82.00%
40% 89.50% 68.00% 80.25%
30% 0% 95.00% 65.00% 74.25%
10% 93.00% 65.50% 75.25%
20% 92.75% 66.50% 76.25%
30% 89.75% 63.00% 76.00%
40% 89.75% 63.25% 77.75%
40% 0% 93.75% 60.25% 69.75%
10% 93.50% 60.50% 70.50%
20% 91.00% 61.25% 73.25%
30% 91.50% 61.50% 72.50%
40% 90.25% 61.25% 74.50%
Average 91.45% 74.08% 80.86%
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